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Abstract 
This article analyzes how the allocation of liability for safety defects could influence 
coordination in the food supply chain. To do so, we analyzed the strategic reaction of 
importers and supermarkets who import Spanish fresh produce into France. We considered 
the implementation and enforcement of the European General Food Law as an exogenous 
shock for French food operators. In France, depending on the situation, food operators can 
transfer their liability to someone else in the food supply and imports decisions are crucial 
indicators. After 2005, supermarkets transferred the liability risk linked to importing sensitive 
products to importers. We argue that this regulatory change also prompted French importers 
of fresh produce to develop a horizontal, collective governance structure to monitor the safety 
of imported produce 
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Introduction 
Food safety is a major preoccupation for consumers, food operators, and public authorities. In 
response to recent food scares, European countries have strengthened their food safety 
standards and their supervision. Adoption to the 2005 General Food Law at the European 
level implies convergence of frameworks across Europe (Garcia-Martinez et al. 2007). 
Through mandatory self-monitoring and quality assurance, the European Union has confirmed 
its willingness to transfer increased responsibility for food quality and food safety to the entire 
food supply chain (Friant-Perrot et al. 2007). The liability rule is the preferred tool to enforce 
the recently promulgated framework in member states. However, the allocation and 
transferability of liability within the supply chain differ among member states. 
In this article, we focus on how the allocation and the transferability of liability for safety 
defects influence strategic responses by food operators in the food supply chain. Measuring 
the impact of a liability rule on coordination is not an easy task. The preferred method would 
have been finding a natural experiment. However, the development of regulatory schemes is a 
continuous process and natural experiments such as exogenous shocks do not exist in the 
regulatory framework. To get round this problem we analyzed the strategic response of 
supermarkets and importers when they import fresh produce into France. The regulatory 
change, which occurred in 2005 in France, implied the strict enforcement of the liability rule 
for food safety defects. Under the French strict liability regime, the first supplier to place 
products on the domestic market bears the liability. If a safety defect occurs, the first supplier 
is held liable under criminal law. Import decisions at the French boarder are thus crucial 
indicators to understand how the allocation of the liability rule shapes the supply chain. At 
this point of the supply chain, liability is transferable from downstream operators 
(supermarkets) to upstream suppliers. 
We established that the allocation of liability affects the organization of the food supply 
ensuring a high level of food safety on the market. The import decisions made by French 
supermarkets determine who bears the liability for imports. When they need imported 
products in their shelves to satisfy consumer demand, they have two choices: to import 
themselves (the make option) or to buy the import service. In the make option, they bear the 
liability. In the buy option, they transfer liability to importers. In this context, we observed 
their import behavior before and after 2005, 2005 being considered as an exogenous shock. 
After 2005, we show that supermarkets changed their behavior. By themselves, they import 
fewer sensitive products than before 2005. For French importers of fresh produce, this change 
led them to develop and implement a new governance structure to prevent food safety 
outbreaks. In other words, we have data that suggests that the allocation of liability influences 
coordination for food safety in the supply chain. 
In the food economics literature, only a few authors studied the legal incentives for the 
provision of food safety (e.g. Buzby and Frenzen 1999; Loureiro 2008). Most research has 
focused on the development of strategic behavior by food operators to comply with new 
regulations (Loader and Hobbs 1999; Henson and Holt 2011; Macaulay 1993). Another 
important strand of literature is based on the seminal work of Garcia-Martinez et al. (2007) 
which provides a framework to deal with co-regulation for food safety. These authors also 
underline the importance of enforcing co-regulation programs. To our knowledge, few 
scholars have focused on the issue of transferability of liability in the organization of food 
chains. 
The article is organized as follows: first, we review the literature focused on food safety and 
liability. Second, we set our analysis in the current European Union regulatory framework for 
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food safety focusing more specifically on differences in liability rules that are in force in the 
United Kingdom and France. Third, we highlight the strategic responses of French 
supermarkets and importers to the 2005 increase in liability implied by the General Food Law. 
The last section concludes. 
1. Food safety, liability and supply chains 
In this section, we first describe food safety issues and regulatory tools that involve incentives 
to food operators to comply with food safety regulations. In particular, we focus on the 
influence of the liability rule that operates within complex market interactions, linked to the 
specificities of managing food safety in supply chains. We highlight the fact that the 
allocation of liability can influence the organization of food supply chains: if food operators 
can transfer liability, we argue that they may adopt strategic responses to avoid or lessen their 
liability burden. 
1.1. Food safety issues 
In the food safety economics literature, asymmetries of information and externalities occur in 
the use of the term ‘food safety’. Food safety is mostly considered as a credence attribute of 
food items: because it would be too costly, consumers are not able to check the real nature of 
the product even after consuming it. Food safety can become an experience attribute for 
consumers who experience a food-borne illness after eating a particular food product (Henson 
and Caswell 1999). Consumers need guarantees of the safety of the food items they eat. While 
this informational asymmetry arises between food operators and consumers, the same also 
happens in business-to-business relationships. In food supply chains, food safety involves 
both an adverse selection problem (safety of the product) and a moral hazard (safety of the 
process) at any stage of the food supply chain. Market failures can be due to the existence of 
asymmetric information about food safety attributes between producers and consumers or 
imperfect, symmetric imperfect information for both consumers and producers (Antle 1996).  
Hennessy et al. (2003) suggest that food supply chains are systemic by nature. As regards 
food safety, food supply chains produce externalities on each other’s activities (Rouvière and 
Soubeyran 2011). After a food safety outbreak, all food operators in the incriminated industry 
will suffer from the crisis at different levels. For instance, in May 2012, the "E-coli cucumber 
outbreak" killed 16 people and infected over 1100 people in Europe. The Spanish Federation 
of Producers / Exporters (FEPEX) estimates the lost sales at €200 million per week. The 
cucumber crisis also affected French producers, who, according to the tomato and cucumber 
producers association, suffered from a 75% fall in sales of French cucumbers1. As a 
consequence, food safety issues have had an impact on the structure of the industry because 
food operators share a collective reputation (Rouvière and Soubeyran 2011).  
Such market failures, asymmetries of information and externalities are the main rationale for 
regulatory intervention in the provision of food safety. But food safety outbreaks have also 
highlighted the failure of governments to protect consumers. Food safety regulation is 
consequently a key policy area that has witnessed the increasing alignment of risk and 
regulation (Garcia-Martinez et al. 2013). Food safety is a core concern for food operators and 
public authorities because they jointly produce food safety. Consequently, food safety 
regulations operate in a context of complex market interactions. Whatever the source of the 
problem, when food safety outbreaks occur, they have widespread political and economic 
                                                             
1 http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2011/06/01/en-france-les-ventes-de-concombres-se-sont-
effondrees_1530387_3234.html 
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consequences (Hennessy et al. 2003). Public authorities need to design incentives to 
encourage all operators in the food supply chain to better monitor and maintain a high level of 
safety in the food supply chain up to consumers. This need is heightened by economic and 
reputational interdependencies within the supply chain. 
 
1.2. Food safety regulatory framework in a context of market interactions 
In most developed countries, food safety regulations focus on setting standards that specify 
how food products should be produced and/or their final safety level (Henson and Caswell 
1999). Certification schemes and mandatory informational labeling have also been developed 
as contributing to direct ex-ante regulation (Caswell and Mojduszka 1996). Another strand of 
direct ex-ante regulation is now widely used in food industries at least in Europe: co-
regulation of food safety. In a very important contribution to food safety economics, Garcia-
Martinez et al. (2007) pointed out that this regulatory change has created greater opportunities 
for public and private interaction in providing food safety. They are the first authors to refer to 
new food safety schemes such as co-regulation of food safety. This confirms the general trend 
in food safety regulation from a command and control approach to a performance based 
approach in direct ex-ante regulation (Henson and Caswell 1999). Garcia-Martinez et al. 
(2007) also pointed out that co-regulation programs are more likely to occur in the monitoring 
and enforcement phases of the regulatory process. In 2013, Garcia-Martinez et al. (2013) 
affirmed that for such programs to be effective, they need to be fully enforced. 
Enforcement of regulation is a core issue in the regulatory process. Depending on the 
institutional environment, offences related to direct ex-ante regulation usually result in 
sanctions, which are imposed through the allocation of liability and its enforcement. The rule 
of liability subsequently plays a role in enforcing direct ex-ante food safety regulation (Buzby 
and Frenzen 1999). Safety standards and ex-post liability rules are frequently used together to 
encourage firms to comply with regulations (Schmitz 2000). Firms that do not comply are 
sued by public authorities or injured consumers and are taken to court, which then rules on 
their liability. Direct ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability rules are considered to be 
complementary and to reinforce one another, thus increasing the incentive for food operators 
to deliver safe products (Innes 2004; Kolstad et al. 1990). The allocation of liability is a major 
incentive to comply with food safety regulations.  
Only a few authors in the food economics literature have studied the legal incentives for food 
safety provision. Buzby et al. (2001) analyzed economic incentives for firms to produce safer 
food created by court-awarded compensation following a microbial food borne illness. 
However, it is worth noting that liability regimes are not always effective since it may be 
difficult for consumers to prove that the illness was caused by the food (Buzby and Frenzen 
1999). The enforcement of liability modifies firms’ behavior as the firms take more 
preventive actions to avoid the liability burden. Loureiro (2008) empirically investigated the 
impact of the application of a liability regime in the decrease in cases of food contamination 
in the United States. She shows that the application of the liability decreased the number of 
food borne outbreaks. Pouliot and Sumner (2008) modelled the effect of an increase in 
liability-traceability for food safety as an incentive to provide safe food. They show that 
traceability allowed food operators to establish they are not responsible for harm. In other 
words, food operators make an effort to avoid or reduce liability. When considering food 
supply, food operators will also base their decisions on the liability risk they face. In a recent 
contribution, Baniak and Grajzl (2013) show that, when firms share a collective reputation (as 
in food supply), market structure, and hence competition policy, this shapes firms' incentives 
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to invest in product safety. In other words, firms' investments in safety depend on market 
structure and on the size of the industry.  
All these studies are based on an implicit assumption: the allocation of liability and the 
structure of the supply chain are exogenous and are not linked. Hennessy et al. (2001) argue 
that there may be causes for regulators to assign liability for food safety failures in order to 
modify the structure of the industry. These authors argue that the allocation of liability would 
establish a leadership hierarchy in food supply chain. In other words, the food operators who 
bear liability will make an effort to provide safety in order to protect themselves against the 
liability burden. 
None of these authors consider that liability can be transferred to other food operators in the 
supply chain. Food chains are both chains of information and chains of products. They are 
complex to analyze and to understand because they are often very long and involve a large 
number of food operators. The organization of food chains is characterized by the 
interconnection between food operators (Hennessy et al. 2003). It is now well known that 
food operators will adopt strategic behavior to adapt to regulatory constraints (Henson and 
Caswell 1999). 
We argue that when liability is transferable, food operators will develop strategic responses to 
avoid the liability burden. Therefore, there may be a link between the organization of the 
supply chain and the “threat” represented by the liability rule, which can represent a very high 
cost for food operators. We argue that liability allocation may be subject to food operators’ 
strategic responses (transfer of the liability burden - or not) thereby influencing the 
organization of the food supply chain. Depending on the liability rule that is in force, if food 
operators can transfer liability to other food operators they will do so to reduce the liability 
risk. If food operators cannot transfer the liability for food safety defects, they will be the 
initiator of the coordination for food safety in the supply chain. 
2. The European regulatory framework for food safety and the influence of the 
allocation of liability. 
In this section, we place our analysis in the current European Union regulatory framework and 
focus more specifically on the liability rule for safety defects in force in the United Kingdom 
and in France. 
2.1.  The European regulatory framework for food safety 
In the European Union, changes in food safety regulations resulted in more involvement of 
food operators in managing food safety in supply chains. The adoption of the General Food 
Law at the European level is providing greater opportunities for closer collaboration between 
regulatory agencies and the private sector in the management of food safety, particularly in 
relation to enforcement and monitoring (Garcia-Martinez et al. 2007).  
In the European Union, the General Food Law has modified the food safety regulations of 
member states. The General Food Law was promulgated in 2002 and has been in force since 
January 1, 2005. The Law aims to ensure not only a high level of protection for consumers, 
but also of animal health and welfare, plant health and the environment. It highlights the need 
for food operators to implement food safety hazard control plans, to trace back their inputs 
and outputs, and to better monitor the safety of their products. In this context, European food 
operators have been encouraged to voluntarily implement and manage safety monitoring of 
their operations (Garcia-Martinez et al. 2007).  
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In the new regulatory framework of the General Food Law, public authorities require food 
operators to achieve prescribed product quality standards but they do not specify the means to 
be used to reach such standards. These are left to the discretion of the food operators. One of 
the key concepts in the General Food Law is that food operators at all stages of the supply 
chain (production, processing and distribution) are responsible for ensuring the fulfillment of 
the food safety regulations that are relevant to their activities. The General Food Law has thus 
established a common basis for food safety regulation in member states and includes common 
definitions, general provisions and specific requirements. It also created the European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA), the EU independent risk assessment body for food safety.  
Like all European regulations, the General Food Law must be transposed in member states 
regulations. Member states shall ensure that official controls are carried out regularly, on a 
risk basis and with appropriate frequency implementing a risk based approach. They must 
identify risks associated with food businesses, processes, activities, and the reliability of food 
operators’ own checks. Regulation (EC) No 178/02 also requires member states to enforce 
food safety regulations. For that purpose, they must develop a system of official controls 
(Regulation (EC) 882 /2004). They must lay down the rules and penalties applicable to non-
compliance with the food law, which must be effective and dissuasive. In all member states, 
the liability rule for safety defects is part of the enforcement process. However, the allocation 
of liability differs between countries. 
2.2. Liability rules for food safety defects in the United Kingdom and France 
In the European Union, the UK and Northern Ireland were the first to implement a regulatory 
change in the provision of food safety, implementing and enforcing the Food Safety Act in 
1990. In the United Kingdom, the General Food Regulations (2004) created criminal offences 
for breaches of Regulation (EC) 178/2002 and amended the Food Safety Act 1990 to bring it 
in line with Regulation (EC) 178/2002. The legislation is identical in Northern Ireland.  
The main feature of the Food Safety Act 1990 was to substitute a “warranty defense” by a 
“due diligence defense”. One consequence is to have shifted the allocation of the liability rule 
for food safety downstream in the food supply chain (Hobbs et al. 2002). The Food Safety 
Act imposed strict liability on downstream firms against food safety failures. The “due 
diligence defense” requires that all food operators implement all the necessary (Hobbs and 
Kerr 1992; Henson and Northern 1998). In other words, downstream operators can be held 
liable if unsafe products are found in their shelves regardless of where the food safety 
problem originated. As a result, the shift in liability significantly affected quality management 
practices and also significantly modified the structure of the food supply chain (Hobbs and 
Kerr 1992; Holleran et al. 1999). This is in line with all theoretical studies that deal with legal 
incentives to food safety (e.g. Innes 2004; Koldstad et al. 1990).  
In this context, many authors claim that the development of private standards owned and 
imposed by supermarkets was linked to this new allocation of liability to downstream 
operators. In a study of the influence of private standards in shaping the food system, Fulponi 
(2006) argues that the Food Safety Act 1990 was the starting point for UK supermarkets to 
improve their safety management programs and those of their suppliers. In her interviews, 
Fulponi discovered that the allocation of liability system was considered by 70% of 
supermarkets interviewed as the impetus for developing private standards. This is in line with 
the results of Hobbs et al. (2002) who conducted an international comparison of the structure 
of incentives and quality assurance schemes for food safety. Loader and Hobbs (1999) 
reported that the introduction of the “due diligence defense” has also modified relationships in 
the supply chains, leading to more partnerships with upstream suppliers. They point out that 
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this vertical and closer cooperation was a way to comply with legal requirements and to avoid 
supermarkets’ liability.  
Garcia-Martinez and Poole (2004) reported that the Food Safety Act has led to more 
coordination of the British fresh produce supply chains than in France or Germany. In France, 
there are legal explanations for the more muted enthusiasm for such vertical relations, the first 
being the allocation of liability which differs from that in the UK. Under the French rule, 
liability rests on the first supplier to place a product on the domestic market. In France, the 
liability rule for safety defects thus applies to the producer of the product.  
The French law promulgated on May 19, 1998 was the transposition of a European directive 
promulgated in 1985 defining the term of “producers of food items” and hence the allocation 
of liability, in the case of a food safety defect. According to this Law, there are three types of 
producers. A producer is i) the manufacturer of a finished product; ii) the producer of any raw 
material; iii) the manufacturer of any component part of a product.  
Food importers who import products into the European Community are thus considered as 
producers. In this respect, the French Law puts importers in the same category as producers, 
because they introduce food items in the domestic market. For non-branded products, the 
producer or the importer of the product bears the liability. For branded products, it is the 
owner of the brand who bears the liability. Hence, food operators who display their name, 
trade mark, or other distinctive sign to on product are also considered to be the producer.  
The newly promulgated General Food Law and its enforcement in 2005 increased the 
importance of avoiding food safety defects and emphasized potential liability. Since the 
implementation of the General Food Law, French food operators, named as producers, have 
been obliged to undertake their own safety controls. In France, food safety regulations are 
monitored and enforced by a regulatory public agency, the General Service for Consumption, 
Competition and the Repression of Fraud (DGCCRF). If the DGCCRF identifies an unsafe 
product, the food operator, namely the producer, will be accused of committing an offence. 
Sanctions range from a warning letter to prosecution and jail. 
In this respect, French supermarkets with their own brand products (Marques De 
Distributeurs (MDD)) combine the role of retailer and manufacturer (or producer) of the 
product on the domestic market. In this particular case, supermarkets cannot transfer liability 
to their suppliers or even to their manufacturer. In this case, private standards have become a 
key tool in the contractual design for managing suppliers of products that will be sold under 
MDD. As part of the customer-supplier relationships, these private standards may be 
described as collective legal acts (Friant-Perrot et al., 2007). Private standards certify the 
competence of the supplier to produce the specified product and also represent a way for 
supermarkets to reduce their liability. Only certified providers can enter the MDD market.  
Liability rules in force in the UK, Northern Ireland and France differ on one point. In the 
United Kingdom, the last suppliers to the supply chain, namely supermarkets, bear the 
liability. They cannot transfer the liability to anyone else in the supply chain. In France, the 
producer, or the first supplier to the domestic market, bears the liability. Such a position in the 
supply chain can be the target of strategies implemented by food operators. They can choose 
to bear the liability or to transfer it to someone else. For this reason, we argue that this 
decision is an important strategic decision for food operators because when choosing their 
status in the supply chain, they influence the organization of the whole food supply chain.  
3. Allocation of liability, transferability and the food supply chain 
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Under French Law, import decisions at the French border are useful indicators to understand 
how the allocation of the liability rule in the supply chain can influence coordination for food 
safety. The regulatory change in 2005 requires stricter enforcement of the liability rule 
applying to the first supplier, namely the importer.  
In this section, we first focus on the import behavior of supermarkets before and after the 
change in the regulation in 2005 because supermarkets can transfer their liability to importers, 
thereby increasing the length of the supply chain. Second, we focus on the strategic response 
of importers who are unable to transfer liability to anyone else.  
3.1. Import themselves or purchase services? French supermarkets’ strategic response to 
liability 
In this section, we highlight supermarkets’ strategic response to the 2005 increase in liability 
created by the General Food Law: does the increase in liability change their import strategies? 
3.1.1 French Supermarkets’ imports trade-off  
Demand for fresh produce has led to an extension of the assortment of categories and to year-
round availability of fresh produce in shelves. In France, more than 70% of sales of fresh 
produce are made in supermarkets (and hard discounters).2 As a consequence, fresh produce 
shelves have become strategic for supermarkets. Supermarkets have to satisfy increasing 
demand combined with strict quality requirements from consumers. France is not self-
sufficient in fresh fruit and vegetables and must thus import produce to satisfy consumer 
demand. This has led to an increase in exports from developing countries to the European 
market. 
To satisfy consumer demand, supermarkets have two ways of importing fresh produce. They 
can import directly from foreign producers to their own supply chain: this is the ‘make’ 
option. They can also deal with importers/brokers of fresh produce who import for them: this 
is the ‘buy’ option. It is worth noting that, for a non-negligible part of their transactions, 
importers/brokers work with supermarkets, 80% of sales by importers are done with 
supermarkets (Rouvière et al. 2010). 
As regards liability, when a supermarket imports directly for its supply chain, it becomes the 
first supplier to place a product on the domestic market, and hence bears the liability. In the 
buy option, the supermarket transfers liability to the broker/importer. The broker/importer 
becomes the first supplier. The broker/importer bears the liability and may be held liable 
under criminal law if some fresh produce he introduced in the market is found to be unsafe. 
This is even true if the unsafe product is identified in the final market, i.e., on the supermarket 
shelves. As producers, first suppliers are liable under criminal law if the imported products do 
not comply with the regulations in force (Rouvière et al. 2010).  
Supermarkets face the following trade-off when filling their shelves: costs of fresh produce 
transactions and costs associated with being held liable versus costs of fresh produce 
transactions and commissions linked to using brokers (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Trade-off made by supermarkets when importing fresh produce into France 
                                                             
2 http://www.rungisinternational.com/fr/bleu/enquetesrungisactu/Fruitsetlegumes640.asp 
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For supermarkets, using a broker/importer increases the length of the supply chain and 
consequently transaction costs. But it is also a way to transfer the risk of being held liable if a 
safety defect occurs. The first supplier to the domestic market is the importer. This implies 
contractual requirements between the two parties to ensure these transactions that have a high 
level of asymmetry of information. When the supermarket decides to import directly, it bears 
the liability. In this case, the supply chain is shorter because the supermarket fulfills the 
import function, hence reducing transaction costs. For supermarkets, the trade-off between the 
make or buy options is between transaction costs and the risk of ex-post liability.  
3.1.2 Supermarkets’ import decisions 
In the following, we focus on supermarkets import strategies from Spain. We chose Spain as a 
case study because it is the main exporter of fresh produce to France and is responsible for 
more than 50% (on average) of the total value of fresh fruit and vegetable imported into 
France. 
To support our hypothesis, we used data from French Customs on imports of fresh produce 
(fresh fruit and vegetables) which document all imports by French firms from foreign 
countries from 2000 to 2011. We then distinguished between imports flows made by 
brokers/importers and by supermarkets. Since we wanted to compare supermarkets’ behavior 
before and after 2005, the year of the implementation of the General Food Law in France, our 
sample included importers and supermarkets who were operating on the market in 2005. Our 
final sample comprised 190 firms, of which 100 are supermarkets and 90 are importers who 
traded fresh fruit and vegetables in 2005. This sample is representative since it covers all 
French supermarkets who imported in 2005 and the exhaustive list of French importers. 
Importers and supermarkets are the main importers of fresh produce into France. French 
custom data for the year 2005 show that importers and retailers (supermarkets) represented 
64% of the total value of trade by trade intermediaries (other than supermarkets or pure 
importers, for instance wholesalers); this represents 37% of total French imports (still in 
value) whereas other trading firms (873 firms other than importers and supermarkets) 
represented 21% of the total value of French imports of fresh produce. 
Some products are more risky to import than others. Fresh produce is very perishable. Its 
quality reaches a peak value at harvest and thereafter the value of the product starts to decline. 
In our analysis, we used two variables to take product risk into account. (Perishability) is a 
dummy variable which takes the value of 0 when the produce is not perishable (e.g. apples) 
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and takes 1 when the life of produce is short (between 1 to 14 days after harvest).3 
(Perishability) approximates the management quality capacities required by supermarkets and 
importers. In addition, there are also food safety issues. The most common food safety hazard 
is that related to chemical contamination (e.g. pesticide residues). The foreign producer is the 
only one able to reduce the risk of excess pesticide residues by implementing good 
agricultural practices. To approximate the sensitivity to pesticides of fresh produce 
(Pesticides), we refer to the list of products that are less sensitive to pesticides published by 
the Environmental Working Group (http://www.ewg.org/). Using this list, we are able to 
classify fruit and vegetables according to their sensitivity to pesticides. (Pesticides) is a 
dummy variable that allows us to identify the 15 cleanest products. (Pesticides) takes 0 if the 
product is one of the 15 cleanest and 1 if the product is not one of the 15 cleanest. Our field 
background is also based on data we gathered during semi-structured interviews conducted 
with main operators in 2005, 2006, 2010 on imports of fresh produce (public authorities, 
regulatory agencies, importers, board of importers). 
Graph 1 shows the respective shares of supermarkets in French imports from Spain. For each 
year, shares are computed as the value imported by supermarkets out of the total value of 
French imports from Spain. Supermarkets shares are proportion plotted in Graph 1 as 
percentage and are thus comprised between 0 and 100%. For instance, in 2005, French 
Supermarkets imported for 256 015 thousand € of fresh fruit and vegetables from Spain. Out 
of the 1 082 991 thousand € of Spanish fresh produce imported by France, supermarkets 
represents 23% of French imports from Spain in 2005.  
Graph 1 shows that supermarkets were responsible for an average of 20% of imports from 
Spain between 2000 and 2011. Up to 2005, supermarkets increased their respective shares of 
imports from Spain. After 2005, there was clear change in this trend as the supermarkets’ 
share of imports from Spain decreased.  
 
Graph 1: Supermarkets share of Imports Shares in French imports from Spain 
 
                                                             
3These data come from the UC Davis post-harvest department: http://postharvest.ucdavis.edu 
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We investigate the reasons for this change in the behavior of supermarkets. Three classes of 
reasons are investigated: i) a decrease in French demand for fresh produce, ii) a switch in 
strategies by supermarkets, iii) supermarkets delegate their imports to brokers/importers.  
The first reason would mean that 2005 represented a change in the consumption of fresh 
produce in France, thus leading to a continuous decrease in demand in supermarkets since 
then. However, this reason is not consistent. The year 2005 revealed no differences in terms 
of the consumption of imported or locally produced fresh produce. In France, the 
consumption of fresh produce has continued to increase since 1980 and is currently 80 kg per 
year per French consumer.4 The year 2005 is not looked on as the first year of the economic 
crisis, which could explain a decreasing trend in French consumption. In 2004, France 
imported 2.7 million tonnes of fresh fruit and vegetables. In 2007, France imported 4.1 
million tonnes. There was thus a net increase in French imports of fresh produce which 
invalidates the hypothesis of a decreasing trend in French consumption. 
The second reason could be a switch in strategy by supermarkets, for example, supermarkets 
imported identical products from another country, namely Morocco. Indeed, Spain and 
Morocco are complementary producers and both export similar fresh produce to France 
(tomatoes, eggplants, squash, onions, etc.) (Rouvière et al. 2010). This information comes 
from a quantitative survey made by one of the authors but is validated by French Customs 
data. In 2005, Morocco challenged Spain by exporting the same products: with Morocco 
exporting 36 products and Spain exporting 59 products. All Moroccan products are included 
in the list of Spanish products. The ten first products exported from Morocco to France are 
tomatoes, squash, strawberries, green beans, cantaloupe melons, citrus, peaches, sweet 
peppers and potatoes (which represent 99% of exports). Eight of those products are on the list 
of the top ten items of fresh produce exported by Spain.  
Distance and trade costs could also explain a possible switch in strategies. However, the 
distance5 between France and Morocco is 1816 km and the distance between France and 
Spain is 1054 km, the products and distance between the two countries of origin are thus 
almost the same, meaning that the costs of handling, managing post-harvest quality and 
transport are also almost the same.  
Graph 2 shows the respective shares of supermarkets in French imports from Morocco 
between 2000 and 2011. Graph 2 shows supermarkets rarely include procurements from 
Morocco (an average of 1% between 2000 and 2011) whereas they do include procurements 
from Spain. There was no increase in supermarket imports from Morocco after 2005. French 
supermarkets did not replace fruit and vegetables imported from Spain by fruit and vegetables 
imported from Morocco.  
 
Graph 2: Supermarkets’ share of imports from Morocco 
                                                             
4 According to the French National Statistics Institute (INSEE) 
5 According to the CEPII database. 
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Procurements from Morocco reach the French market in winter. In winter, neither French nor 
Spanish producers can market their own products, but supermarkets need fresh produce in 
their shelves. When needed, supermarkets thus import produce from importers/brokers. 
Importers/Brokers were responsible for an average of 90% of imports from Morocco between 
2000 and 2011. Between procurements from Spain and Morocco, there is consequently a clear 
country effect. Importers/brokers overcome trade costs from small countries outside the EU. 
The third reason could be the enforcement of the first supplier liability rule in France in 2005. 
The regulatory change in 2005 required the strict enforcement of the first importer liability 
rule and supermarket should have transferred their own imports to importers/brokers.  
Graph 3 shows supermarkets’ and importers/brokers’ shares in imports from Spain to France. 
We can observe that brokers and supermarkets activities are complementary in terms of 
products imported from Spain. This is in line with the results for products from Morocco. 
When the supermarkets’ share of imports decreases, the brokers’ share of imports increases. 
In other words, after 2005, supermarkets compensated for their decrease in imports by using 
brokers to import the necessary products. After 2005, supermarkets imported more products 
using brokers.  
Graph 3: Supermarkets’ and brokers/importers’ shares of imports from Spain6 
                                                             
6 Imports_Brokers s is computed as the total value imported by brokers out of the total value of fresh imported 
from Spain into France.  The same has been done for supermarkets: Imports_SMK. 
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In the following, we analyze the regulatory change in liability in 2005 as being an exogenous 
shock. We can then study an ex-ante/ex-post situation for supermarkets. To this end, we 
introduce variability in imports that distinguishes between risky imports and no-risk imports. 
In our analysis, we introduce risk variability in the form of two variables (Perishability) and 
(Pesticides). 
We observe supermarkets’ behavior with respect to products imported from Spain before and 
after 2005 according to the types of product risk. We have just shown that supermarkets’ 
imports from Spain were not replaced by imports from Morocco. No other exit option was 
available for supermarkets for products from Spain. Supermarkets imported more using 
brokers after 2005.  
Our empirical strategy is highlighting the potential product effect that could explain this 
change in behavior with respect to imports. In other words, we analyze whether the 
substitution between supermarkets and importers remains the same as a function of product 
characteristics. If the substitution effect is the same between risky and no-risk products, there 
is no liability effect. If the substitution effect is not identical, we have evidence for the 
influence of the 2005 enforcement of the liability rule. The importation of no-risk products is 
considered as counterfactual to enable our analysis. 
We use a three step approach: 
First, we computed the share of supermarkets and brokers in risky7 products vs. no-risk 
products in the total value of products they import each year from Spain. We obtained four 
shares: Brokers_Risky, Brokers_no-Risk, Supermarkets_Risky, Supermarkets_no-Risk. 
For instance, in 2005, the brokers’ share of pesticide-sensitive products was 64% 
(Brokers_Pesticides) and the brokers’ share of non-sensitive products to pesticides was 5% 
(Brokers_NonPesticides). The supermarkets’ share of pesticide sensitive products was 29% 
(Supermarkets_Pesticides) and the supermarkets’ share of non-sensitive products to pesticides 
                                                             
7 In the following, we replace the term Pesticides and Perishability by Risky as explained above. 
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was 1% (Supermarkets_NonPesticides). This computation gives us the distribution of 
products between the two agents.  
Second, we computed the difference between brokers’ and supermarkets’ shares according to 
the type of product. This resulted in two differences: 
· Diff-Risky = (Brokers_Risky - Supermarkets_Risky)  
· Diff-noRisk = (Brokers_noRisk - Supermarkets_noRisk).  
Our example gives 2005 Diff-Pesticides= 0.69 - 0.29=0.30 and Diff-NonPesticides=0.04. This 
computation allows us to consider the volume effect since importers import more than 
supermarkets.  
Third, we computed the difference in difference: Diff-Diff_Risky = Diff_Risky - Diff_noRisk. 
The 2005 example gives: Diff-Diff_Pesticides = 0.26. Comparing this difference in each year 
allows us to take time into account.  
For our analysis, if the expression (Diff-Diff_Risky) always shows the same trend over time, 
there is no substitution effect between risky and no-risk products. The substitution effect is 
identical in both types of products. If the (Diff-Diff_Risky) trend is not stable over time, then 
there is a substitution effect between risky and no-risk products. Graph 4 plots the three 
differences according to the sensitivity of the product to pesticides. 
Graph 4: Influence of 2005 on supermarkets’ import behavior concerning pesticide 
sensitive products8 
 
Graph 4 shows a decrease in Diff-Diff_Pesticides before 2005 indicating that supermarkets 
increased their imports of such products before 2005. After 2005 there was an increase in 
Diff-Diff_Pesticides: supermarkets decreased their own imports relative to imports by brokers. 
Concerning products that are not sensitive to pesticides, no clear change is apparent. This 
explains the trend of the Diff-Diff_Pesticides curve. From our analysis, we can argue that 
                                                             
8 Diff-Pesticides = (Brokers_Pesticides - Supermarkets_Pesticides); Diff-NonPesticides= (Brokers_NonPesticides - 
Supermarkets_NonPesticides); with Brokers_Pesticides/ Supermarkets_Pesticides, Brokers_NonPesticides/ Supermarkets_NonPesticides 
being the shares of imports made by brokers and supermarkets in pesticide sensitive products and non-pesticide sensitive products. 
Diff-Diff_Pesticides = Diff-Pesticides - Diff-NonPesticides 
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there is a clear substitution effect. In 2005, supermarkets started to transfer imports of 
sensitive products to brokers, at the same time transferring the risk of being held liable. 
Contracting on safety is difficult and generally leads to very incomplete contracts. Producers 
are far away and products are very sensitive and might be risky for the importer. 
Supermarkets need to preserve their reputation and wish to avoid being held liable. Whereas 
contractual design could help to reduce transaction costs, supermarkets prefer to transfer both 
the liability and the procurement to importers. The risk of being held liable and the transaction 
costs prevent supermarkets from incorporating this procurement and encourage them to work 
with importers. Transferring liability increases the length of the supply chain. 
Graph 5 plots the three differences according to (Perishability). In Graph 5, Diff-Perish and 
Diff-NonPerish show the same trend (a decreasing trend before 2005 and an increasing trend 
thereafter). An effect of 2005 is apparent; the two curves follow the same pattern, i.e. a 
decreasing trend showing that supermarkets increase their procurement of both types of 
products. After 2005, the two curves increase, illustrating that the share of imports of 
supermarkets becomes smaller (relatively to that of importers/brokers). 
Graph 5: Influence of 2005 on supermarkets’ behavior in importing perishable 
products9 
 
However, the Diff-Diff_Perish curve shows a stable trend over time. We can argue that there 
is no 2005 effect in this case. Indeed, the Diff-Diff_Perish curve keeps the same trend over 
time i.e. presents no subsequent changes. There is no substitution between perishable and 
non-perishable products provided by supermarkets to consumers. We can explain this result 
by the fact that perishability is at least more observable and manageable than safety. In other 
words, while still important, the risk of perishability is avoidable for supermarkets. Bad 
quality products are eliminated before being marketed. This option remains costly but could 
help supermarkets preserve their reputation and prevent them from being held liable for 
quality defects. This is not the case of product safety attributes.  
                                                             
9 Diff-Perish = (Brokers_Perish - Supermarkets_Perish) ; Diff-NonPerish= (Brokers_NonPerish - Supermarkets_NonPerish) ; Diff-
Diff_Perish = Diff- Perish - Diff-non Perish with with Brokers_Perish/Supermarkets_Perish, 
Brokers_NonPerish/Supermarkets_NonPerish being the shares of imports made by brokers and supermarkets in perishable products 
and non- perishable products. 
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These two results indirectly emphasize that product characteristics influence the decision of 
supermarkets to vertically integrate (or not) the function of importing and thus affect the 
length and the shape of the supply chain. When the risk of being liable is too high, the food 
supply chain is longer than when the product is not risky. In the latter case, products can be 
imported directly by supermarkets.  
Based on the Spanish case, we can conclude that the enforcement of the liability rule in 2005 
has an impact on the shape of the supply chain because it influences the strategic decision of 
supermarkets when importing fresh produce that is sensitive to pesticides from Spain. We 
have thus established that the newly enforced regime of liability influenced the supermarkets 
decision to integrate upstream transactions.In food supply, food operators do not only 
consider the magnitude of transaction costs when incorporating upstream functions. We have 
established that product characteristics and the liability regimes may play a major role in 
organizing safe food supply. 
3.2. Importers’ horizontal coordination for food safety.  
Since the implementation of the General Food Law, French importers of fresh fruit and 
vegetables have been obliged to undertake their own safety controls. These controls aim to 
ensure that imported fruit and vegetables respect the Maximum Residue Limits (MRL) for 
pesticides as defined by the European Law (Regulation (EC) No 396/2005). However, the 
newly promulgated European framework underlines that importers as producers must 
implement due care to guarantee that produce imported are safe. In this case, importers cannot 
strategically transfer liability to another food operator in the supply chain.  
To comply with this new regulation, French importers of fresh produce chose to implement 
on-site inspections. Horizontal safety schemes were thus developed in the two main import 
markets of fresh produce. The “Démarche Qualité10 ” (Quality approach) was designed and 
proposed by importers of fresh produce located in Perpignan. The “FeL Partenariat11” (FeL 
Partnership) was proposed by importers located in the Rungis market. These horizontal safety 
schemes appeared as a new governance structure that was negotiated between public 
authorities (DGCCRF) and a group of importers. The implementation of the General Food 
Law gives legitimacy to these public-private partnerships for food safety, which are defined 
as co-regulation (Garcia-Martinez et al. 2013; Rouvière and Caswell 2012). It also highlights 
horizontal coordination among importers. They compete on the market but they collaborate to 
provide safe fresh produce. 
Those new horizontal coordination schemes were developed to better comply with the new 
European food safety regulation. However, the French regulation remains in force and 
importers must continue to abide by the performance standard irrespective of any other efforts 
they have introduced to monitor safety. Importers are still liable under criminal law if a safety 
defect is found. The goal of this safety scheme is to achieve better levels of safety in fresh 
produce entering the French market. In the event of a safety failure, an importer that 
subscribes to the program will be considered by public authorities as having acted in good 
faith and the negligence based liability rule will apply.  
In other words, for importers in the program, there is a gap between the Letter of the Law and 
its enforcement. This was the main commitment of DGCCRF in recognizing the program: 
participants can be held liable (under a strict liability rule) if and only if they have failed to 
                                                             
10  http://www.saintcharlesinternational.com/Pages/demarche%20qualite.aspx 
11 http://www.csif.eu/sites/fr/notre-savoir-faire/fel-partenariat 
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take due care (no analysis). The liability rule thus moved from a strict liability rule to 
negligence based liability rule. Under strict liability, an injurer will be found liable whenever 
an injury has occurred. Under the negligence rule, the injurer will be found liable if and only 
if he/she failed to take due care. 
Membership in the program thus provides importers with an assurance scheme against food 
safety hazards that may occur in the fresh produce they import. According to interviews 
conducted by one of the authors with representative of importers and with public authorities, 
the enforcement of the liability rule for safety defect was one of the most important reasons 
for designing and implementing the horizontal safety schemes.  
The General Food Law and its implementation led to effective enforcement of the liability 
rule for safety defects, at least for French imports of fresh produce. We can infer from this 
case that the new enforcement of the rule of liability led to a change in the behavior of both 
importers and public authorities. Importers are liable under criminal law if the product they 
import is not safe. Importers understood that the regime of liability could create risks. In 
response, they conceived, developed and enforced, through their representatives, a new 
governance structure to ensure the safety of imported product. These safety schemes have 
modified the behavior of importers as regards safety effort and monitoring (Rouvière et al. 
2010). Importers also cooperate in order to provide a high level of safety for imported fresh 
produce. It has also generated a new way for public authorities to enforce the liability rule that 
applies to this market. Historically speaking, the mission of the public authorities was to 
check public standards with the frequent use of sanctions. The introduction of this safety 
scheme has caused its function to change to a more preventive role (Rouvière and Caswell 
2012).  
Last but not least, the negotiation has also softened the regime of liability since a negligence 
based rule has been accepted for importers within the group. However, the liability regime for 
importers remains a strict liability regime. This is in line with theoretical arguments on legal 
incentives for the provision of food safety. Because they bear the liability, importers 
collectively initiated and developed an original food safety scheme. Coordination for food 
safety can be assumed as a collective strategic response for food operators to adapt to 
regulatory changes and reduce the liability burden. Such a response also influenced the 
organization of the supply chain.  
Concluding Remarks 
This article analyzes the influence of the allocation of liability for safety defects on the 
organization of food supply. We frame our analysis in the current European regulatory 
framework which, in 2005, led to better enforcement of the French strict liability regime. We 
show that, because of this liability regime, supermarkets prefer to transfer the liability risk 
rather than to incorporate the importing function. In other words, we argue that, in food 
supply, when liability is at stake, reducing transaction costs is not the only criterion taken into 
consideration when deciding whether to vertically incorporate upstream transactions. Product 
characteristics with respect to safety and liability regimes may also play an important role. 
The latter has an impact on the organization of the food supply chain. Second, we argue that 
this shock generated the development of a new governance structure among importers to 
ensure quality and safety.  
From these two case studies, we can conclude that the liability rule directly and indirectly 
shapes (through supermarkets influence) the supply chain, at least concerning French imports 
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of fresh produce. These results should provide some insights for public authorities when 
designing rules of liability and thinking about their enforcement in food supply.  
For instance, the same trend of regulation appeared in the USA, with the Food Drug 
Administration (FDA) and the Food Safety Modernization Act (FFSMA) of 2010. The 
FFSMA requires all food processors, manufacturers, packers and handlers to identify and 
implement preventive efforts to minimize and prevent food safety hazards. The promulgation 
and implementation of the (FFSMA) prompted a discussion on the safety of imported food 
and the liability regime of importers (Koenig 2011). Our results highlight the fact that 
decisions concerning liability regimes are important issues. Indeed, depending on the 
allocation of the liability, the consequences will not be the same for the organization of the 
food supply chain.  
Depending on its design and its allocation, the liability rule will change the structure of the 
industry. It will modify relationships between food operators, and hence modify market 
interactions between food operators. This implies that the economic structure and market 
incentives can also change. For instance, it may exclude some foreign producers or open the 
way for the development of new markets – for instance a certification market. Further 
research will focus on these interactions between liability regimes, market forces and 
interactions and their influence in shaping horizontal and vertical coordination schemes for 
food safety between food operators, and thus in shaping the food supply chain. 
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